

the meetings over a period not exceeding two years. Experience has demonstrated that it is not feasible to establish arbitrary guidelines for judging the reasonableness of such a qualification. Its reasonableness must be gauged in the light of all the circumstances of the particular case, including not only the frequency of meetings, the number of meetings which must be attended and the period of time over which the requirement extends, but also such factors as the nature, availability and extent of excuse provisions, whether all or most members have the opportunity to attend meetings, and the impact of the rule, i.e., the number or percentage of members who would be rendered ineligible by its application.²⁵

(a—1) In *Steelworkers, Local 3489 v. Usery*, 429 U.S. 305, 94 LRRM 2203, 79 L.C. ¶11,806 (1977), the Supreme Court found that this standard for determining validity of meeting attendance qualifications was the type of flexible result that Congress contemplated when it used the word “reasonable.” The Court concluded that Congress, in guaranteeing every union member the opportunity to hold office, subject only to “reasonable qualifications,” disabled unions from establishing eligibility qualifications as sharply restrictive of the openness of the union political process as the Steelworkers’ attendance rule. The rule required attendance at fifty percent of the meetings for three years preceding the election unless prevented by union activities or working hours, with the result that 96.5 percent of the members were ineligible.

(b) Other guidance is furnished by lower court decisions which have held particular meeting attendance requirements to be unreasonable under the

following circumstances: One meeting during each quarter for the three years preceding nomination, where the effect was to disqualify 99 percent of the membership (*Wirtz v. Independent Workers Union of Florida*, 65 LRRM 2104, 55 L.C. par. 11,857 (M.D. Fla., 1967)); 75 percent of the meetings held over a two-year period, with absence excused only for work or illness, where over 97 percent of the members were ineligible (*Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass’n*, 244 F. Supp. 745 (W.D. Pa., 1965), order vacating decision as moot, 372 F. 2d 86 (C.A. 3 1966), reversed 389 U.S. 463; decision on remand, 405 F.2d 176 (C.A. 3 1968)); *Wirtz v. Local 262, Glass bottle Blowers Ass’n*, 290 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal., 1968)); attendance at each of eight meetings in the two months between nomination and election, where the meetings were held at widely scattered locations within the State (*Hodgson v. Local Union No. 624 A-B, International Union of Operating Engineers*, 80 LRRM 3049, 68 L.C. par. 12,816 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 19, 1972)); attendance at not less than six regular meetings each year during the twenty-four months prior to an election which has the effect of requiring attendance for a period that must begin no later than eighteen months before a biennial election (*Usery v. Local Division 1205, Amalgamated Transit Union*, 545 F. 2d 1300 (C.A. 1, 1976)).

[38 FR 18324, July 3, 1973; as amended at 42 FR 39105, Aug. 2, 1977; 42 FR 41280, Aug. 16, 1977; 42 FR 45306, Sept. 9, 1977; 50 FR 31311, Aug. 1, 1985; 60 FR 57178, Nov. 14, 1995]

§ 452.39 Participation in insurance plan.

In certain circumstances, in which the duties of a particular office require supervision of an insurance plan in more than the formal sense, a union may require candidates for such office to belong to the plan.

§ 452.40 Prior office holding.

A requirement that candidates for office have some prior service in a lower office is not considered reasonable.²⁶

²⁵ If a meeting attendance requirement disqualifies a large portion of members from candidacy, that large antidemocratic effect alone may be sufficient to render the requirement unreasonable. In *Doyle v. Brock*, 821 F.2d 778 (D.C. Circuit 1987), the court held that the impact of a meeting attendance requirement which disqualified 97% of the union’s membership from candidacy was by itself sufficient to make the requirement unreasonable notwithstanding any of the other factors set forth in 29 CFR 452.38(a).

²⁶ *Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel and Club Employees Union, Local 6*, 391 U.S. 492 at 504. The Court stated that the union, in applying such a rule, “* * * assumes that rank and file union

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